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Development of the western region is vital to the balanced growth of China. Luo 
studies the impacts of infrastructure investment that may most efficiently alleviate the burden 
of geographical remoteness of the West.  
Having constructed the “adjusted distance” to approximate the transport cost, which 
takes into account the effects of real distance and infrastructure development, the author 
defines the “peripheral degree” to measure the effective remoteness of a province to an 
economic center. Using panel data for 1979-99 from the Chinese provinces, she shows that 
geographic attractiveness plays a significant role in a Solow-type growth determination 
model. Given the invariability of pure geographic position, progress in transportation 
facilities is essential to reduce the geographic handicap and to encourage the catching-up of 
the western region. 
The author’s simulation results show that the central transportation hubs (Hubei, 
Henan, and Hunan) merit most the infrastructure investments, for they favor the development 
of many provinces, if regional balanced growth is considered as the prime objective. In 
particular, improvement in the transportation facilities in central hubs will have greater 
effects on western development than that in the western region by itself. Improvements in the 
transportation facilities of the central hubs substantially improves the geographic 
attractiveness of the western region by reducing the transport cost from the West to the Coast 
and by promoting the emergence of new economic centers in such hubs, which tends to 
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The Role of Infrastructure Investment Location  




China, with a population of 1.3 billion and a surface of 9.6 million squared 
kilometers, has achieved great success since the late 1970s. The country’s economic size 
increased more than 6.5 times in 21 years as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased 
from $145 billion USD (constant 1995) in 1978 to $964 billion USD (constant 1995) in 
1999.
1  
Despite this great success of the economy as a whole, China has suffered from 
unbalanced growth among the different provinces: the coastal region is much more developed 
than the inland area due to more favorable geographic position and economic policies.
2 In 
general, the farther away a province is from the coast, the weaker its performance is.  In 
1999, the GDP per capita of the western provinces was less than half of that of the coastal 
provinces. Such unbalanced regional growth hinders the further development of the Chinese 
economy. On one hand, the backwardness of the western region and resulting inequality of 
incomes across China undermines longer-term growth prospects and social stability; on the 
other hand, the underdevelopment limits the potential of domestic market enlargement, 
hindering the possibility of the relocation process of traditional industries from eastern 
regions to central and western ones. 
In addition to the topological and climatic disadvantages, the western provinces 
experience limited market accessibility due to their geographical remoteness from the 
domestic economic centers of the coast. We argue that it is the transport cost, which is 
                                                             
* The author is indebted to Deepak Bhattasali and Paul Brenton for excellent comments. The author is also 
grateful to Henri-François Henner and Nong Zhu for fruitful discussion. 
1 Source: World Bank database. 
2  In general, according to the criterion of geographic position, we classify Chinese provinces into three 
categories: coastal, central, and west. According to the regional classification of the "Statistics of China's Fixed 
Assets and Investment 1950-1985," the coastal region includes Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan; the central region includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Nei 
Mongol, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi; the western region includes Guangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Xizang. Here, although Guangxi has direct 
access to sea, it is considered as a western province given its economic backwardness. The central region and 
the western region are considered as the inland regions. See annex 1 for more details.   2
conditioned by the real distance and by the infrastructure development level of the itinerary, 
rather than the distance per se that influences interregional trade volume. We thus construct 
an indicator "peripheral degree" to measure the geographic attractiveness of a province, 
namely, its effective remoteness to economic centers. The significant negative role that the 
remoteness to the economic centers, that is, the peripheral degree, plays on regional growth 
suggests a pessimistic prognosis for the development of the western provinces. The most 
efficient way to facilitate the growth of the inland/western provinces is to develop the 
infrastructure to lower the transport cost and lessen the relative effective remoteness of the 
western region. In general, for a given distance, the better the infrastructure is, the lower the 
transport costs are and the better the market accessibility is. Infrastructure development will 
“shorten” the distance, so that geographic position will play a less important role.  
Given current limitations on infrastructure investments, the key question becomes 
how to efficiently locate infrastructure investment to optimize the effects on regional 
development. By simulating the influence of a 10 percent increase in transportation network 
density in each province, we demonstrate that infrastructure investments in transportation 
hubs in central China have greater effects on western development than those in the western 
region; the former lowers the effective remoteness of the West to economic centers. On the 
one hand, the improvement of the transportation facilities in central hubs reduces the 
transport cost between West and East; on the other hand, the emergence of the central 
provinces as regional economic centers modifies the geo-economic production structure in 
favor of lowering the peripheral degree of the West.
3  
This paper is organized as follows: section two emphasizes the unbalanced regional 
growth and briefly reviews the theoretical models; section three focuses on the construction 
of the adjusted distance and peripheral degree; section four demonstrates the role of 
geographic position on regional growth determination; section five simulates the effects of 
different infrastructure investment location on regional growth; and section six presents our 
policy suggestions on the development of transportation facility in central transportation 
hubs. 
2. Background Description and Theoretical Review 
In China, coastal provinces have experienced higher growth rates and better 
development than have the inland provinces. Accordingly, we consider the coastal provinces 
                                                             
3 See Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999).   3
to be economic centers. Favored by economic policies of opening-up and by advantageous 
geographical positions, the growth rate of coastal provinces was much higher than that of the 
inland provinces for the last two decades. This higher growth rate further enlarged the 
development gap (table 1).
4  
Table 1. Provincial GDP Per Capita and Annual Growth Rate 
  GDP per capita (yuan 1978) 
Average annual growth rate 
(%)  Provincial 
Code  Province  1978 1985 1992 1999  79-89  90-99  79-99 
Coastal 
Region            
1  Beijing  1249   2109   3358   6222   7.01  8.35  7.65 
2  Tianjin  1141   1941   2714   5656   6.14  9.25  7.62 
3  Hebei  362   586   994   2239   6.99  10.53  8.68 
6  Liaoning  675   1107   1759   3164   7.23  7.49  7.35 
9  Shanghai  2484   4032   6161   14065   6.16  10.57  8.26 
10  Jiangsu  427   872   1722   4082   9.94  11.64  10.75 
11  Zhejiang  330   805   1529   3796   10.69  12.68  11.63 
13  Fujian  271   567   1102   2895   9.73  13.00  11.29 
15  Shandong  315   614   1099   2614   8.67  11.62  10.08 
19  Guangdong  365   725   1637   3600   10.06  11.83  10.90 
Central 
Region        
4  Shanxi  363   637   905   1611   6.70  7.53  7.10 
5  Nei Mongol.  318   630   964   1747   8.16  8.04  8.11 
7  Jilin  381   668   1099   2115   8.03  8.29  8.16 
8  Heilongjiang  558   835   1218   2102   5.62  7.07  6.31 
12  Anhui  242   483   657   1548   8.07  9.68  8.84 
14  Jiangxi  273   488   781   1623   7.51  9.55  8.48 
16  Henan  231   453   702   1480   8.34  9.42  8.85 
17  Hubei  330   662   973   2108   8.14  9.59  8.83 
18  Hunan  285   463   702   1363   6.38  8.65  7.46 
Western 
Region        
20  Guangxi  223   334   534   1062   5.15  9.95  7.44 
21  Sichuan  252   475   737   1361   7.73  8.36  8.03 
22  Guizhou  174   326   472   765    7.74 6.33 7.07 
23  Yunnan  223   395   650   1141   7.88  7.64  7.77 
24  Shaanxi  292   500   782   1415   7.81  7.20  7.52 
25  Gansu  346   515   844   1487   6.69  7.22  6.94 
26  Qinghai  426   627   805   1355   4.81  6.29  5.51 
27  Ningxia  366   618   885   1531   7.07  6.54  6.82 
28  Xinjiang  317   621   1098   1769   8.70  7.63  8.19 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various editions) and author's calculations. The data of Chongqing 
are included in Sichuan for better coherence. We do not include Hainan, which is an island without 
direct road/railway connection with the continent, and Xizang because of their special characteristics.  
 
                                                             
4 See Démurger and others (2001) for a detailed description of Chinese regional development history – favored 
by the geographically targeted Region Development Plan initiated under Deng Xiaoping and the advantageous 
endowment, coastal provinces developed much better than the inland ones following reforms.    4
Taking out the three city provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, figure 1 shows 
the enlarging regional development gap: at the end of 1990s, all coastal provinces were more 
developed than the inland ones.
5 The curves parallel to the axis “year” show the better 
performance of the coastal provinces during the last two decades with the steeper slopes; 
those parallel to the axis “code” confirm the backwardness of the inland provinces, in 
























Figure 1. Enlarging Development Gap between Coastal Provinces (except Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Shanghai) and Inland Provinces, 1978-99 
It is generally true in China as well as throughout the world that distance from 
economic centers is associated with the limited market access. The influx of goods and 
technologies become more expensive and the exportations to partners gain less profit, for the 
burden of transport costs increases with distance, other things being equal (Venables and 
Limao 1999). The geographical attractiveness of a region, measured by its market access, is 
hence determined by its relative remoteness to the economic center. The greater the market 
access is, the higher the economy of scale is that an economy can pursue. 
The gravity model developed by Bergstrand (1985), Deardorff (1995), and 
Guillaumont, Brun, and De Melo (1998), to name a few, demonstrates that the greater the 
                                                             
5 The three municipalities directly under the Central Government─Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai─always have 
a much higher level of real GDP per capita than the other provinces. The real GDP per capita of Shanghai is at 
least five times the national average level, and that of Beijing and Tianjin is twice more. 
























































Provincial Code   5
economic mass of the trade partners and the smaller the distance between them, the greater 
their bilateral trade volume is. More often, the GDP level is taken as the measure of economic 
mass, the attraction factor in gravity model. However, as to the resistance factor, real distance 
between two concerning regions is not necessarily the best proxy (Hummels 1999a, 1999b; 
Walz 1996; Crafts and Venables 2001). It is not the distance per se that hinders bilateral 
commerce; rather, it is the transport cost, which lessens the profit margin between cost of 
exporter and price of importer, that impedes trade. As developed in Limao and Venables 
(2000), transport cost is determined not only by the absolute geographical distance between 
trade partners but also by the development level of infrastructures of the itinerary concerned, 
namely, including that of the transit regions. The development level of the transportation 
infrastructure is thus vital for regional development. 
The density of transport network is one of the important indices of infrastructure 
development, which may serve as measure of the infrastructure development level (Brot and 
Gérardin 2001; Catin, Ghio, and von Huffel 2002). The denser the transport network between 
two partners is, the higher the probability is that a better route for transport purposes can be 
identified. In the absence of tariffs on internal trade, transport cost captures most of the 
barriers of interprovincial trade. For a given real distance, the better the infrastructure 
development of itinerary is, the lower the transport cost is. Luo (2001) shows that the 
distance adjusted by infrastructure development level serves as a better proxy of resistance 
factor. 
Growth theory suggests that regional growth rate is conditioned by  its initial 
development level. If the initially poorer always tends to grow faster than the initially richer, 
it is a case of absolute convergence. However, other than the initial development level, 
regions may be heterogeneous in many other aspects, such as investment rate and 
demographic growth rate (Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996). It may not be reasonable to consider that all Chinese regions have 
the same development capacity in the long run. The theory of conditional convergence, which 
emphasizes the regional long-term development difference and its determinations, 
corresponds more closely to the reality: the farther away an economy is from its own long-
term development capacity, the faster its growth rate is (Bernard and Durlauf 1995; Ben-
David 1997; Venables 1999; Ben-David and Kimhi 2000; Maureth 2001). In other words, an 
economy converges to its own steady state, which is not necessarily common for different 
regions (Funke and Strulik 1999).    6
Therefore, the focal point turns to find out the factors that condition long-term 
development capacity. As suggested by Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999); Redding and 
Venables (2000); and Radelet and Sachs (1999), high transport costs will damage export 
performance and economic growth. This paper argues that the geographical position of a 
region, which influences its market access, constitutes an important determinant of regional 
economic performance. We will test the role of the effective remoteness of a region to the 
economic center in the Solow-type growth determination model and examine the effects of 
the location of infrastructure investment on regional growth to identify the most efficient way 
to favor western development. 
3. Peripheral Degree  
Geographically adjoining regions tend to share similar economic performance. Given 
the fact that climate and topology play an important role in influencing disease burdens, 
agricultural productivity, and location in transport costs, it is not surprising that the 
distribution of economic activities is spatially uneven (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999; 
Henderson, Shalizi, and Venables 2000). The homogeneity of the adjacent regions 
demonstrates that geographical position may be an important factor that conditions economic 
growth, as detailed in Baumont and others  (2000) and Davis and Weinstein (1997). This 
section concentrates on constructing a peripheral degree to measure the relative remoteness of 
the province in question to an economic center and examines the role of peripheral degree in 
regional growth.  
To measure the market accessibility of a province to a domestic economic center 
(here, the coastal provinces), taking into account the relative importance of the economic size 
of different coastal provinces, we define its peripheral degree, noted asPD, as the weighted 
sum of the adjusted distance between this province and all the coastal provinces.
6 The 
influence of the demand from a partner province on the economic performance of the 
province in question is positively correlated to the economic mass of the former. We weigh 
the adjusted distance between the province in question (i) and a coastal province ( j ) by the 
economic mass of the latter relative to that of coastal provinces in total to approximate the 
relative importance of the effective remoteness. The reason lies in that the farther away the 
province in question is from a great size coastal province, the more serious the disadvantage 
is that it suffers. We suppose that, other things being equal, the structure of demand is similar   7
among different regions, namely, the percentage of demand satisfied by local production (and 
thus that satisfied by the production of other provinces) is the same, as suggested by Courcier 
and Laffay (1972). Taking the influence of the economic mass of various coastal provinces 
and that of the transport cost on market accessibility of the province in question into account, 
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where  t i PD ,  represents the peripheral degree of province i at time t;  t ij DistA ,  represents the 
real distance between province i  and  province  j   adjusted by the development level of 
infrastructure of the itinerary that connects these two provinces at time t, namely the adjusted 
distance between province i  and  province  j  at time t  suggested by Luo (2001)
7;  t j GDP ,  
represents the real GDP of province  j  at time t. Here,  j  represents the coastal provinces, 







Figure 2. Relation between Peripheral Degree and Economic Growth Rate of Chinese 
Provinces, 1978-99 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
6 In the case of China, all important harbors situate in coastal provinces. The relative remoteness to coastal 
provinces is positively correlated to the relative remoteness to international markets. 
7 See annex 2 for the construction of the adjusted distance. 
8 We exclude Hainan from our sample for its unique island characteristics.   8
Figure 2 shows a strong correlation between peripheral degree and economic 
performance (in logarithmic forms): the higher the former is, the weaker the latter is. The 
important role of geographic position in regional development is also confirmed by the 
correlation study: the rank correlation between peripheral degree and real per capita GDP, 
both in logarithmic forms, is significantly negative with an average Spearman's Rho value of 
–0.5549, and the probability of independence between these two variables is zero.
9 By 
examining the Spearman's Rho value of each year, we find that this rank correlation becomes 




















Pr>|t| stands for the probability of independence of ldp and lyt . 
 
Figure 3. Spearman's Rank Correlation between Peripheral Degree and  
Real Per Capita GDP of Chinese Provinces, 1978-99 
 
We argue that geographical position plays an increasingly important role on regional 
development, as Chinese economy becomes more market-oriented. At the beginning of the 
economic reform in the late 1970s, the performance of the Chinese economy was distorted by 
the inefficient allocation of resources, and the regional development level did not well reflect 
                                                             
9 To lessen the sensitivity to extreme values, we prefer Spearman's rank correlation estimation to standard 
Pearson correlation estimation. Spearman's rank correlation is calculated as Pearson's correlation computed on 
the ranks and average ranks (Spearman (1904), Conover (1980)). The significance is calculated using the 
approximation  ) 1 / 2 , 2 (
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the development capacity.
10 As the economic reform deepens, regional comparative 
advantages become an important factor that determines the production structure. Favored by 
better access to foreign markets and benefited by the opening-up policies, coastal provinces 
grow much faster than inland ones, exacerbating the problem of unbalanced growth  (Woo 
1998). Given the fact that the geographical economic position of a province will not be 
altered significantly by fundamental external policy change, it is reasonable to predict that the 
core peripheral development pattern will continue. Appropriate policies may be needed to 
rebalance regional development. 
4. Growth Determination  
Using the macroeconomic data from Chinese Statistic Yearbooks, Comprehensive 
Statistic Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China, and China Regional Economy: A 
Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening Up, and the distance data from the Map of 
Communication Facilities of China, this section studies the determination of annual growth 
of Chinese provinces during 1978-99, emphasizing the role of geographical position.  
The neoclassical growth model suggested by Solow-Swan (1956) emphasizes the 
effects of physical investment rate and demographic growth rate. The higher the ratio is of 
physical investment to GDP, the higher the productivity of effective labor is in long-run 
equilibrium, other things being equal. Trying to explain the enormous contribution of fixed 
capital in growth, the augmented Solow-Swan model argues the importance of human capital. 
The importance of the increasing return to scale renders the homogeneity of production 
function in various regions questionable, as suggested by the theory of new economic 
geography (Krugman 1991). Specialization and agglomeration amplify regional differences.
11 
Other than the demographic growth rate, the Solow-Swan model argues that the technological 
progress rate and depreciation rate of fixed investments influence regional growth. However, 
not all parameters that condition long-term economic performance are available or 
measurable. The omission of regional specific characteristics may lead to bias in estimation 
results. Hence, panel data estimation is preferable to cross-section estimation, for the former 
may capture the nonmeasurable specific characteristics in the fixed-effect model. We also 
introduce year dummies to control for the short-term effects. 
                                                             
10 Pursuing the sake of "political security" and being aware of the "critical threat from the foreign capitalists," 
the Chinese government allocated a great deal of its industrial investment in the inland provinces during its 
"planned-economy" period. Subordinated to the "political goal," the comparative advantages of various 
provinces were not well considered before economic reform. 
11 See Ricci 1999, Krugman (1995), Puga (1999), Quah (2001), and Venables (2000).   10
We start by testing the very simple hypothesis of absolute convergence (divergence) 
and estimate the following panel model: 
t i
t
t t t i t i t i dummy y y y ,
1998
1979
1 , 1 , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε χ ρ α ∑
=
− − + + + = −       ( 1 )  
The first equation in table 2 shows that the initial development level  ) ln( 1 , − t i y  plays a 
significant role on regional growth. However, bearing in mind that Chinese provinces are 
heterogeneous, we do not think it reasonable to admit the hypothesis of their long-term steady 
state homogeneity – the premise of the existence of absolute convergence (divergence). As 
we have shown in the preceding section that geographical position, which represents regional 
market accessibility, may play an important role in influencing economic performance, we 
introduce the variable of peripheral degree, noted as  t i PD, , into our estimation:  
t i
t
t t t i t i t i t i dummy PD y y y ,
1998
1979
, 1 , 1 , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε χ θ ρ α ∑
=
− − + + + + = −      (2) 
In the second equation, the variable  ) ln( 1 , − t i y  continues to be significantly negative, 
which signifies conditional convergence. As predicted, the variable  t i PD,  plays a negative 
role on regional growth. The omission of this pertinent variable biases estimation results.  
According to the Solow-Swan model, we suppose that production function is of the 
type of Cobb-Douglas:  
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i g n s y y y , , , , , 1 , 1 , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε δ η γ υ ϑ + + + + + + = − − −  
where s stands for the ratio of physical investment to GDP; n the demographic growth rate; 
g  the technology progress, and δ  the depreciation rate of physical investment. Many 
precedent studies on regional growth, such as that of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), 
suppose that the sum of these two parameters is homogeneously equal to 0.05. However, in 
the case of China, it seems that this hypothesis is questionable given the fact that Chinese 
provinces are so different from one another. Due to the data unavailability of g  and δ , we 
prefer to leave their influences implicitly into fixed effects:  
t i
t
t t t i t i t i t i t i t i dummy n s PD y y y ,
1998
1979
, , , 1 , 1 , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε χ ζ γ θ ρ α + + + + + + = − ∑
=
− −  (3)   11
The significance of the demographic growth rate in the third equation is consistent to 
the prediction of growth theory. The nonsignificance of the investment ratio may be the 
results of the fact that economic profit optimization, represented by marginal return 
equalization, may be sacrificed for regional development goals; the location of the physical 
investment does not respond well to market demand. 
Given the significant difference between coastal and inland regions, according to the 
Chow test, we estimate the two subsamples separately in equations 4 and 5. As figure 2 
shows, the relationship between peripheral degree and growth rate is not linear. To further 
investigate the role of peripheral degree, we add two supplementary variables,  () []
2
, ln t i PD  and 
) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − × t i t i y PD  into our model:  
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The sixth equation shows that for the coastal provinces the variable  ( ) []
2
, ln t i PD  plays a 
significantly positive role on regional growth, which implies that the higher the peripheral 
degree is, the weaker the growth rate is, while such negative effects decrease as its value 
increases.
12 The interactive term  ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − × t i t i y PD  is also significantly positive, which 
signifies that for a given level of peripheral degree, the higher the initial development level is, 
the higher the regional growth rate is. According to the classical growth model, as suggested 
by the first equation, the convergence effects are captured by the coefficient of the variable 
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However, once we have controlled for the role of peripheral degree, as suggested by the sixth 
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+ 1 β ) ln( ,t i PD . 
                                                             
12 The econometric results of the sixth equation vividly corroborates our figure 2, when the peripheral degree is 
modest, the negative effect is great; when it is very high, further increase of geographic remoteness will lead to 
less economic performance loss.   12
In other words, the size of convergence effects is conditioned by the peripheral degree. The 
positive sign of the coefficient  1 β  and the negative sign of the coefficient β  demonstrate that 
convergence effects decrease as we control for the geographical economic position and the 
geographic remoteness limits convergence of the coastal province, other things being equal. 
For the subsample of the inland provinces, these two additional variables are not that 
significant, which implies that over a certain limit the negative role of the geographic 
remoteness tends to be linear. We hence consider equations 5 and 6 for the growth 
determination specification for inland and coastal provinces respectively. 
The convexity of the peripheral degree on regional growth signifies the trap of 
remoteness that western provinces suffer. As the famous "liquidity trap," when the interest 
rate is lower than a certain level, its further reduction may not be able to induce private 
investment. When peripheral degree is high, great improvement will be needed to encourage 
local performance. 
Table 2. Provincial Growth Determination: Role of Peripheral Degree, 1978-99 
Dependent variable :  ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − − t i t i y y  
  National  National  National  Coast Inland Coast Inland 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
) ln( 1 , − t i y   -0.044*** -0.082*** -0.066*** -0.061*** -0.137*** -1.397***  -0.661** 
  (-3.47) (-5.35) (-4.47) (-2.65) (-5.20) (-3.77) (-2.04) 
) ln( ,t i PD    -0.197*** -0.168*** -0.085  -0.254*** -5.275***  -2.187** 
    (-4.26) (-3.56) (-1.44) (-3.11) (-3.49) (-2.13) 
) ln( ,t i s       -0.003 0.005 -0.013 0.024 -0.013 
      (-0.30) (0.35) (-1.02) (1.59) (-1.04) 
) ln( ,t i n       -1.066*** -0.747**  -0.798* -0.839*** -0.703* 
      (-4.35) (-2.58) (-1.95) (-2.97) (-1.71) 
) ln( ) ln( , , t i t i PD PD ×         0.273***  0.106* 
        (3.40)  (1.95) 
) ln( ) ln( , 1 , t i t i PD y × −         0.144***  0.054 
        (3.61)  (1.58) 
Constant  0.201*** 2.026*** 1.731***  1.016*  2.678***  25.827***  11.552** 
  (5.24) (4.71) (4.01) (1.88) (3.58) (3.60) (2.37) 
         
Adjusted  R  square  0.5025 0.5187 0.5585 0.7192 0.5325 0.7391 0.5412 
Observation  number  588 588 568 208 360 208 360 
Note: t-students are in brackets. * significant in 10 percent ; ** significant in 5 percent ; *** significant in 1 
percent.  ) ln( 1 , − t i y  stands for initial real GDP per capita in logarithmic form;  ) ln( ,t i PD peripheral degree in 
logarithmic form;  ) ln( ,t i s   physical investment ratio in logarithmic form;  ) ln( ,t i n   population growth rate in 
logarithmic form. For simplicity, the time dummies are not represented in the table. 
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5. Simulations 
An improvement of transportation facilities reduces the peripheral degree of the 
concerned provinces and favors their economic performance. Hence, the infrastructure 
investment policies are important to regional balanced growth. The peripheral degree, by 
construction, is determined by the distance between the province in question and the national 
economic center and by the infrastructure development level of the transit economies. A 
similar improvement of transportation facilities in different provinces does not lead to the 
same modification of peripheral degree in different provinces. As shown in the following 
box, an increase of transportation network density in one province does not only lead to the 
change of its own peripheral degree; it also leads to that of the other concerned provinces.  
 Transportation Network Density and Peripheral Degree 
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As to a province i, all modification of the transportation network locates in a 
province v, which situates in its itinerary to the coastal provinces, will lead to a modification 
of its peripheral degree. As to a province v, an improvement of its transportation 
infrastructure favors all provinces i that cross it to join the coastal provinces. The heavier the 
traffic is that transits through province v, in which case province v is considered as a 
transportation hub, the more provinces will benefit from its transportation facility 
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In this section, we simulate the effects of a hypothetical increase of 10 percent in the 
transportation network density in each province, as follows, on the growth of the whole China 
and of the different regions, to evaluate the effects of the location of the infrastructure 
investment on regional balanced growth.  
First, using the value of the peripheral degree that we have constructed with the 
observed value of the initial development level, the physical investment rate, and the 
demographic growth rate of all provinces, and applying the values of the coefficients 
( t χ ζ γ θ ρ α , , , , , ) that we have estimated in table 2, we calculate the estimated value of the 
dependant variable " ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − − t i t i y y ", noted as  t i gaes, , using the third estimation in table 2: 
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Second, we multiply the transportation network density of the province v 
(v=1,2,3,…28) by  110 percent, so we obtain a new value of  t i PD , , noted as  t i v PD , ) ( , due to 
the modification of  t v D , . 
Third, we put the new value of  t i v PD , ) (  into the equation in replace of  t i PD ,  to calculate 
the new value of the estimated variable " ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − − t i t i y y ", noted as t i v gaes , ) ( .  
Fourth, we define t i t i t i gaes v gaes v gadif , , , ) ( ) ( − = , which stands for the increase of the 
growth rate of province i  in year t  due to the hypothetical increase of the transportation 
network density in province v.  
Fifth, to take into account the difference of the economic size of each province, we 
calculate the weighted average growth effects due to the modification of  t v D , , noted as 
t v gaeff ) ( : 














PIB v gadif v gaeff  
The underlying idea lies in the notion that the larger is the economic size of the province 
in question in comparison with that of the whole group, the greater are the effects of the 
improvement of its economic performance on the growth of the group.   15
Finally, to evaluate the effects of the change of  t v D ,  in each province v on the growth of 
different groups of provinces and hence on the regional balanced growth, we calculate the 
following ratios: 
1)  ∈ i all Chinese provinces,  t v gaeff ) (   stands for the growth effects on the whole 
Chinese economy due to a 10 percent increase in the density of the transportation network in 
province v in year t , noted as  t v gaeff ) ( 0  
2)  ∈ i   all coastal provinces,  t v gaeff ) (   stands for the growth effects on the coastal 
region due to a 10% increase in the density of the transportation network in province v in 
year t, noted as  t v gaeff ) ( 1  
3)  ∈ i  all inland provinces,  t v gaeff ) (  stands for the growth effects on the inland region 
due to a 10 percent increase in the density of the transportation network in province v in year 
t, noted as  t v gaeff ) ( 2  
4)  ∈ i  all western provinces,  t v gaeff ) (  stands for the growth effects on the western 
region due to a 10 percent increase in the density of the transportation network in province v 
in year t, noted as  t v gaeff ) ( 3  
For simplicity, we calculate the following variables to study the average induced 

































m v gaeff  
As the first column "national" shows, to generate the largest impacts on the growth of 
the whole China, we should locate the infrastructure investments in the coastal provinces, in 
particular, in Shandong, Jiangsu, and Hebei. Given the economic size of the coastal provinces 
and their role as economic centers, it is not surprising that the improvement of the 
                                                             
13 The induced effects on the growth of different groups of provinces in each year are available upon request.    16
transportation network in these provinces results in substantial effects on the weighted 
average growth of China as a whole. However, such favorable growth effects concentrate 
mainly in coastal regions, as shown the second column "coastal."
14 The rapid growth in 
coastal provinces will enlarge the regional development gap, even though this growth pattern 
might be an efficient way to encourage national growth. 
Table 3. Regional Growth Induced by 10 percent Hypothetical Transport Network Density 
Increase in Different Provinces (province in question included) 
National   Coastal  Inland  West 
Province  m v gaeff ) ( 0    Province  m v gaeff ) ( 1 Province  m v gaeff ) ( 2 Province  m v gaeff ) ( 3
Qinghai        0.03   Shanxi  …  Qinghai        0.07  Nei Mongol  … 
Xinjiang       0.03   Nei Mongol  …  Xinjiang       0.07  Jilin          … 
Nei Mongol  0.13   Jilin  …  Nei Mongol  0.27  Heilongjiang   … 
Ningxia        0.26   Heilongjiang  …  Ningxia        0.57  Xinjiang       0.18 
Gansu          0.35   Guangxi  …  Gansu          0.77  Qinghai        0.19 
Yunnan         0.39   Sichuan  …  Yunnan         0.87  Ningxia        1.62 
Heilongjiang   0.55    Guizhou  …  Heilongjiang   1.24  Tianjin        1.70 
Guangxi        0.61   Yunnan  …  Guangxi        1.36  Gansu          2.16 
Guizhou        0.69   Shaanxi  …  Guizhou        1.55  Yunnan         2.47 
Jilin          1.26   Gansu  …  Tianjin        1.77  Jiangxi        2.61 
Shanxi         1.59   Qinghai  …  Beijing        2.71  Beijing        2.72 
Shaanxi        1.67   Ningxia  ...  Jilin          2.83  Guangxi        3.88 
Sichuan        1.85   Xinjiang  …  Shanxi         3.55  Shanxi         4.05 
Tianjin        2.72   Jiangxi  1.04  Shaanxi        3.73  Guizhou        4.41 
Jiangxi        3.03   Anhui  1.16  Fujian         3.78  Fujian         4.83 
Beijing        4.70   Tianjin  3.49  Sichuan        4.04  Liaoning       5.03 
Anhui          5.80   Hubei  3.80  Jiangxi        5.50  Shanghai       6.54 
Hunan          7.80   Henan  3.99  Shanghai       6.68  Shandong       7.09 
Fujian         8.48   Hunan  4.07  Liaoning       9.84  Zhejiang       7.61 
Hubei          9.68   Beijing  6.32  Guangdong      10.23  Jiangsu        7.86 
Liaoning       9.74   Shanghai  9.68  Zhejiang       10.39  Hebei          9.40 
Henan          10.21   Liaoning  12.28  Jiangsu        10.80  Shaanxi        10.58 
Shanghai       10.54   Fujian  13.67  Shandong       10.94  Guangdong      10.79 
Guangdong      12.80   Guangdong  14.86  Anhui          11.44  Sichuan        10.86 
Zhejiang       14.33   Zhejiang  17.52  Hunan          12.44  Anhui          10.98 
Hebei          17.87   Hebei  20.24  Hebei          15.00  Hunan          14.34 
Jiangsu        19.05   Jiangsu  25.78  Hubei          16.90  Henan          16.13 
Shandong       20.31   Shandong  27.90  Henan          17.67  Hubei          19.89 
Note: Figures are presented in 1/10000. " … " stands for the figures inferior to 0.0000005. For example, a 10 
percent increase in the transport network density in Shandong province leads to a 20.31×10
-4 increase of the 
growth rate of the whole China. Coastal provinces are marked in italics; transport hubs are marked in bold.  
 
As the third column "inland" shows, to stimulate the economic performance of the 
inland provinces, which are actually lagging behind, we should locate the investments in the 
central provinces transportation hubs of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. This location choice also 
maximizes the favorable effects on the growth of the western provinces, as shown in the last 
column. The improvement of the transportation facilities in these central provinces leads to 
the greatest impacts on the rapid growth of the western provinces.  As the third column 
"inland" shows, even if the growth of the coastal provinces is not integrated in the variable 
m v gaeff ) ( 2 , the improvement of the transportation network in certain coastal provinces, in 
                                                             
14 Here we have even neglected the great multiplier effect of infrastructure investment on local growth.   17
particular Hebei, generates greater induced effects on the growth of the inland provinces than 
that in most of the other inland provinces. If we focus on the induced effects on growth in 
western provinces, as shown in the last column "West," the effects of the investments in the 
central provinces of Hubei, Henan, and Hunan are the largest. In addition, the induced effects 
of the investments in some coastal or central provinces, such as Guangdong, Anhui, and 
Hebei, are greater than those in most of the remote western provinces. 
To study the effects of an improvement of transportation network density in one 
province on the growth of the other provinces and verify the robustness of our simulation 
results, we calculate the same ratios excluding the province in question. We calculate 














PIB v gadif v gaeff  for all  v i≠  to purge the effects of the investment on local 
growth.
15 
Table 3 bis. Regional Growth Induced by 10 Percent Hypothetical Transport Network Density 
Increase in Different Provinces (province in question excluded) 
National   Coastal  Inland  West 
Province  m v gaeff ) ( 0    Province  m v gaeff ) ( 1 Province  m v gaeff ) ( 2 Province  m v gaeff ) ( 3
Nei  Mongol …    Shanxi  …    Nei  Mongol …    Nei  Mongol … 
Heilongjiang …    Nei  Mongol  …    Heilongjiang …    Jilin  … 
Yunnan …    Jilin  …    Yunnan …    Heilongjiang  … 
Xinjiang …    Heilongjiang  …    Xinjiang …    Yunnan  … 
Qinghai  0.02   Guangxi  …   Qinghai  0.04   Xinjiang  ... 
Sichuan 0.04    Sichuan  ...    Sichuan 0.09    Qinghai 0.11 
Guangxi  0.16   Guizhou  ...   Gansu  0.35   Sichuan  0.34 
Gansu  0.16   Yunnan  …   Guangxi  0.37   Gansu  1.03 
Ningxia 0.19    Shaanxi  …    Ningxia 0.43    Guangxi  1.17 
Guizhou 0.38    Gansu  …    Guizhou 0.86    Ningxia  1.22 
Shanxi 0.79    Qinghai  …   Tianjin  1.77   Tianjin  1.70 
Jilin 0.80    Ningxia  …    Shanxi 1.82    Jiangxi 2.61 
Shaanxi  0.96   Xinjiang  …   Jilin  1.86   Guizhou  2.62 
Tianjin  1.73   Jiangxi  1.04   Shaanxi  2.19  Beijing  2.72 
Jiangxi 2.14    Anhui  1.16   Beijing  2.71   Shanxi  4.05 
Beijing  2.90   Tianjin  1.70   Jiangxi  3.58   Fujian  4.83 
Anhui 4.49    Beijing  3.06   Fujian  3.78   Liaoning  5.03 
Hunan  6.34   Hubei  3.80   Shanghai  6.68   Shanghai  6.54 
Shanghai  6.50   Henan  3.99   Anhui  8.85   Shaanxi  6.88 
Fujian  7.39   Hunan  4.07   Hunan  9.41   Shandong  7.09 
Hubei  7.75   Shanghai  6.34   Liaoning  9.84   Zhejiang  7.61 
Henan  8.01   Liaoning  6.52   Guangdong  10.23   Jiangsu  7.86 
Liaoning  8.11   Fujian  10.46   Zhejiang  10.39   Hebei  9.40 
Guangdong  10.39   Guangdong  10.52   Jiangsu  10.80   Guangdong  10.79 
Zhejiang  12.38   Zhejiang  14.16   Shandong  10.94   Anhui  10.98 
Jiangsu  16.36   Hebei  17.85   Hubei  13.13   Hunan  14.34 
Hebei  16.48   Jiangsu  21.81   Henan  13.41   Henan  16.13 
Shandong  17.48   Shandong  23.63   Hebei  15.00   Hubei  19.89 
Note : Figures are presented in 1/10000. " … " stands for the figures inferior to 0.0000005. For example, a 10 
percent increase in the transport network density of Shandong province leads to a 17.48×10
-4 increase of the 
growth rate of China as a whole (except Shandong). Coastal provinces are marked in italics; transport hubs are 
marked in bold.  
                                                             
15 If the province v  is not a member of the group in question, the value of the ratio in table 3 bis is the same as 
the one in table 3.   18
As shown in table 3 bis, the infrastructure investments in the three central provinces 
of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan generate the largest induced effects on the growth of the western 
provinces, even when the effects on their local growth are excluded.
 That the infrastructure 
investments in the three central provinces of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan generate the largest 
induced effects on the growth of the western provinces, even when the effects on their local 
growth are excluded, confirms the vital importance of the improvement of transportation 
facilities in these provinces, which are densely crossed by traffics. 
To test the robustness of our simulation results, we use equations 5 and 6 in table 2 for 
inland provinces and coastal provinces respectively, which consider the difference between 
these two regions.
16 Our results show that it is always the improvement in central 
transportation hubs that generates the highest effects on regional balanced growth.
17 
6. Regional Policy Suggestions  
We suggest developing the infrastructure of the provinces that are on the way of 
transportation from many western provinces to markets, namely, the transportation hubs of 
China. In fact, the market access of one province, and hence its long-term development, 
depends not only on its own infrastructure development but also on the infrastructure 
development of the transit provinces. To reduce the effective remoteness and to enlarge the 
market access of the western region, we should develop the infrastructure that connects the 
provinces to markets. Since the government finances most of the infrastructure investments, it 
is possible to carry them out in selected provinces to favor the West.  
With the nonnegligible multiplier effect of infrastructure investment on local 
economic development, the additional investment in the coastal provinces may aggravate the 
unbalanced development of China. Further infrastructure developments within coastal regions 
may lead to the enforcement of agglomeration, which will accelerate regional growth of 
coastal regions relative to the western ones.  Such policies violate the equity criterion.  
Other things being equal, we suggest giving priority to the development of the western 
region to ensure basic infrastructure development. If the infrastructure is too poor for local 
enterprises to have the minimum demand because of market segmentation, the development 
of western region may be unrealizable due to the lack of microeconomic foundations. The 
                                                             
16 See annex 3 for details. 
17 We have also simulated a 10 percent increase in the national average transportation network density to control 
for the effects of different hypothetical density increase in absolute value due to the different initial density of 
transportation network in each province. The ranking of the provinces regarding to the size of the induced 
growth effect stays the same. Results are available upon request.   19
appropriate investment in the West is necessary to guarantee basic intraregional 
transportation facilities. However, while the development of the infrastructure inside the 
region facilitates intraregional transportation and enlarges the market of local enterprises, it 
does so only within the province itself. The political inclination to western regional 
development does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all infrastructure investments 
should be located in the western region. To so locate infrastructure investments would entail 
the risk that, without a sufficient infrastructure development of the central region, trade 
volume between the East and the West would be limited. Because western provinces are far 
more underdeveloped, their local demands are modest and their technology and management 
are less advanced. The separation of East and West renders the investment in the West much 
less efficient. 
To take the two criteria, equity and efficiency, into account at the same time, it is 
more advisable to locate infrastructure investments in the hubs of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. 
As transportation hubs, although they may be less developed compared with the coastal 
provinces, they are already relatively developed, at least in terms of transportation conditions. 
For the specialty of infrastructure investment itself, the additional sum to a reasonably well-
developed location generates greater positive effects than those to less-developed places. This 
is not to conclude that we should neglect the development of remote border provinces 
because of their current relative less developed situations. Developing the hubs favors the 
outward-looking production structure of the western region and facilitates the transfer of 
technology and management skills from East to West.  
However, one potential problem that we must consider is that when we strengthen 
infrastructures, say, the transportation network, from the West to the East, we improve the 
accessibility of the eastern provinces to western markets. While this improved accessibility 
accelerates the development of the West, it has inherent risks insofar as the coastal and 
central regions can supply better goods at lower prices. For the sake of long-term growth of 
the West and thus of China as a whole some appropriate regional economic policies, such as 
regulations that reasonably protect the privileges of western local enterprises as infant 
industries, must be issued to limit this negative effect. In addition, given the fact that the 
infrastructure development level of some western provinces is too poor to provide basic 
facilities of transportation and that infrastructure investment itself generates a large multiplier 
effect on local development, it is reasonable to locate some infrastructure investment there to 
help to break the vicious cycle. In particular, investments in the provinces Sichuan and 
Shaanxi are recommended, given their important role in regional development.    20
In short, we should take both the efficiency criterion and the equity criterion into 
consideration to choose locations of infrastructure investments. Because central hubs favor 
the balanced development of China, they are the best locations.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Infrastructure development is important for regional performance. Geographic 
remoteness to economic centers significantly hinders regional growth. Improving 
transportation facilities, which reduces transportation costs, increases the volume of trade and 
technology transfer. Targeted infrastructure investment in central transportation hubs favors 
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Annex 2.  Construction of the Adjusted Distance 
The construction of the adjusted distance between one province (province j) and the province 
in question (province i) includes four steps: 
1.  For each province (noted as province v), we calculate its road density and railway density, noted 
as  t v DR ,  and  t v DF ,  respectively. Then, to better reflect the importance of road transportation and 
the railway transportation, we weight them with the road transportation volume and the railway 
transportation volume to get the transportation network index of the province ( t v D , ,): 
t v t t v t t v DF a DR a D , 2 , 1 , + = . 
Where a1t represents the percentage of the road transportation volume and a2t represents that of 
the railway at time t. a1t+ a2t=1. 
2.  For each two provinces (province i and province j), we calculate the index of the transportation 
facility between them, noted  t ij D , . Suppose that to transport some goods from province i to 
province j, it should go through n provinces (province i and j included), we take the index 









3.  We define the real distance between province i and province j ( t ij Dist , ) as the weighted sum of 
their road distance ( t ij DistR , ) and railway distance ( t ij DistF , ). 
t ij t t ij t t ij DistF a DistR a Dist , 2 , 1 , + =  
4.  We define the adjusted real distance between province i and province j ( t ij DistA , ) as the result of 
their real distance divided by the index of their transportation facility. 
t ij t ij t ij D Dist DistA , , , / =  
For a given real distance, the adjusted real distance implies that, the better the transportation 
facility is, the less the adjusted distance is. The transportation facility "shortens" the economic 
distance between the two provinces by reducing the transportation cost. The adjusted real 
distance is a better proxy of the transportation cost. The shorter the adjusted real distance is, the 
less the trade obstacles between two partners and so the greater the volume of trade between 
them, other things being equal. The greater the trade volume is between two provinces, the better 
the market accessibility is to the other in the view of the province in question, and  the influence 
of partner province’s demand on the local market is greater.  
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Annex 3.  Robustness Test 
Taking into account the difference between the coastal provinces and inland provinces and 
testing the robustness of the results of the ranking of the provinces, we calculated the estimated value 
of the dependant variable " ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − − t i t i y y ", noted as  t i gaes, , separately. For coastal provinces: 
= − − ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , t i t i y y
t i
t
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and for inland provinces :  
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Using the similar process stated in section 5, we have the simulation results as follows: 
Table 3a. Regional Growth Induced by 10 Percent Hypothetical Transport Network Density 
Increase in Different Provinces, Distinguishing Coastal and Inland Provinces  
(province in question included) 
National   Coastal  Inland  West 
Province  m v gaeff ) ( 0    Province  m v gaeff ) ( 1 Province  m v gaeff ) ( 2 Province  m v gaeff ) ( 3
Qinghai  0.05   Shanxi  …  Xinjiang  0.10   Nei  Mongol..  … 
Xinjiang  0.05   Nei  Mongol. …  Qinghai  0.11   Jilin  … 
Nei  Mongol.  0.19   Jilin  …  Nei  Mongol. 0.42   Heilongjiang  … 
Ningxia  0.39   Heilongjiang …  Ningxia  0.87   Xinjiang  0.28 
Gansu  0.53   Guangxi  …  Gansu  1.17   Qinghai  0.30 
Yunnan  0.59   Sichuan  …  Yunnan  1.32   Ningxia  2.45 
Heilongjiang 0.84    Guizhou  …  Heilongjiang 1.88   Tianjin  2.57 
Guangxi  0.92   Yunnan  …  Guangxi  2.07   Gansu  3.28 
Guizhou  1.05   Shaanxi  …  Guizhou  2.35   Yunnan  3.74 
Jilin 1.91    Gansu …  Tianjin  2.68   Jiangxi  3.97 
Shanxi 2.41    Qinghai  …  Beijing  4.12   Beijing  4.12 
Shaanxi  2.54   Ningxia  ...  Jilin  4.30   Guangxi  5.89 
Sichuan  2.80   Xinjiang  …  Shanxi  5.39   Shanxi  6.15 
Tianjin  3.79   Jiangxi  2.60  Shaanxi  5.66   Guizhou  6.69 
Jiangxi 5.16    Anhui  2.88  Fujian  5.74   Fujian  7.33 
Beijing  6.77   Hubei  3.25 Sichuan  6.14    Liaoning  7.64 
Anhui 9.42    Henan  3.43 Jiangxi  8.35    Shanghai  9.93 
Hunan  10.36   Hunan  3.47  Shanghai  10.14   Shandong  10.76 
Fujian  11.58   Tianjin  4.69  Liaoning  14.93   Zhejiang  11.55 
Liaoning  12.64   Beijing  8.92  Guangdong  15.53   Jiangsu  11.92 
Hubei  13.31   Liaoning  10.76  Zhejiang  15.77   Hebei  14.27 
Henan  14.06   Fujian  16.27  Jiangsu  16.39   Shaanxi  16.05 
Shanghai  15.18   Guangdong  18.86  Shandong  16.60   Guangdong  16.38 
Guangdong  17.41   Shanghai  19.20 Anhui  17.36    Sichuan  16.48 
Zhejiang  22.07   Zhejiang  27.10  Hunan  18.87   Anhui  16.66 
Hebei         26.15    Hebei         28.88  Hebei  22.76   Hunan  21.76 
Jiangsu  32.56   Jiangsu  45.69  Hubei  25.64   Henan  24.48 
Shandong  35.28   Shandong  50.30  Henan  26.81   Hubei  30.18 
Note : Figures are presented in 1/10000. " … " stands for the figures inferior to 0.0000005. For example, a 10 
percent  increase in the transport network density in Shandong province leads to a 35.28×10
-4 increase of the 
growth rate of the whole China. Coastal provinces are marked in italics; transport hubs are marked in bold.  
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Table 3a bis. Regional Growth Induced by 10 Percent Hypothetical Transport Network Density 
Increase in Different Provinces, Distinguishing Coastal and Inland Provinces 
 (province in question excluded) 
National   Coastal  Inland  West 
Province  m v gaeff ) ( 0    Province  m v gaeff ) ( 1 Province  m v gaeff ) ( 2 Province  m v gaeff ) ( 3
Nei Mongol.  …   Shanxi  … Nei Mongol. … Nei Mongol..  …
Heilongjiang …    Nei  Mongol.. … Heilongjiang … Jilin  …
Yunnan …    Jilin  … Yunnan … Heilongjiang  …
Xinjiang …    Heilongjiang … Xinjiang … Yunnan  …
Qinghai 0.03    Guangxi  … Qinghai 0.06 Xinjiang  ...
Sichuan 0.06    Sichuan  ... Sichuan 0.14 Qinghai 0.17
Gansu 0.24    Guizhou ... Gansu 0.53 Sichuan  0.52
Guangxi 0.25    Yunnan  … Guangxi 0.57 Gansu  1.56
Ningxia 0.29    Shaanxi  … Ningxia 0.65 Guangxi  1.77
Guizhou 0.58    Gansu  … Guizhou 1.31 Ningxia  1.85
Shanxi 1.20    Qinghai  … Tianjin  2.68 Tianjin  2.57
Jilin 1.22    Ningxia  … Shanxi  2.76 Jiangxi  3.97
Shaanxi 1.45    Xinjiang  … Jilin  2.82 Guizhou  3.98
Tianjin  2.57   Tianjin  2.48 Shaanxi 3.33 Beijing  4.12
Jiangxi 3.82    Jiangxi 2.60 Beijing  4.12 Shanxi 6.15
Beijing  4.33   Anhui  2.88 Jiangxi  5.43 Fujian  7.33
Anhui 7.44    Hubei  3.25 Fujian  5.74 Liaoning  7.64
Hunan  8.08   Henan  3.43 Shanghai  10.14 Shanghai  9.93
Shanghai  9.93   Hunan  3.47 Anhui 13.43 Shaanxi  10.44
Hubei  10.31   Beijing  4.51 Hunan  14.29 Shandong  10.76
Fujian  10.51   Shanghai  9.73 Liaoning  14.93 Zhejiang  11.55
Henan  10.64   Liaoning  10.99 Guangdong  15.53 Jiangsu  11.92
Liaoning  12.88   Fujian  14.52 Zhejiang  15.77 Hebei  14.27
Guangdong  17.03   Guangdong  18.38 Jiangsu  16.39 Guangdong  16.38
Zhejiang  18.47   Zhejiang  20.83 Shandong  16.60 Anhui 16.66
Hebei  22.97   Hebei  23.15 Hubei  19.93 Hunan  21.76
Jiangsu  25.49   Jiangsu  34.33 Henan  20.35 Henan  24.48
Shandong  26.74   Shandong  36.18 Hebei  22.76 Hubei  30.18
Note : Figures are presented in 1/10000. " … " stands for the figures inferior to 0.0000005. For example, a 10 
percent increase in the transport network density of Shandong province leads to a 26.74×10
-4 increase of the 
growth rate of the whole China (except Shandong). Coastal provinces are marked in italics; transport hubs are 
marked in bold.  
 
The results, shown in tables 3a and 3a bis, confirm that the improvement of the transport 
network in central provinces of Hubei, Henan, and Hunan leads to the most favorable impacts on 
regional balanced growth. Hence, the ranking of the provinces is not sensitive to the difference in the 
estimation specifications. 
 
 
 
 
 